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III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of The Case
This appeal arises from two rulings by the district court. First, the district court granted

summary judgment for the Respondent, Syringa Surgical Center, LLC, holding that it cannot be
held vicariously liable for Dr. Allen's negligence. In its ruling, the district court erred when it
found that the Appellants did not allege that Dr. Allen acted negligently on the day of or during
the surgical procedure.

The district court further found that no facts existed supporting a

principal/agent relationship between Dr. Allen and the Respondent. According to the district
court, at the time of the alleged negligence, Dr. Allen was not acting as a staff member or an
owner of the Respondent, saying these were the only two contexts in which Respondent could be
found vicariously liable.
Second, the district court ruled that the testimony of Appellants' expert witness, Dr. Paul
E. Wischmeyer ("Dr. Wischmeyer"), was inadmissible because it lacked adequate foundation
and was more prejudicial than probative. In so ruling, the district court disregarded the standard
for evaluating expert testimony established by this Court in Nield v. Pocatello Health Servs.,
Inc., 156 Idaho 802, 332 P.3d 714 (2014).
evidence relied upon by Dr.

The district court impermissibly weighed the

Wischmeyer, and concluded that his testimony lacked factual

foundation.
In its findings, the district court ignored material facts related to Dr. Allen's drug abuse
and relapse.

The district court further assigned undue credibility to the defense witnesses'
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testimony with established biases in favor of the Respondent and Dr. Allen. The district court
also weighed and reconciled contradictions in deposition testimony in the Respondent's and Dr.
Allen's favor regarding Dr. Allen's drug use and the witnesses' knowledge thereof.
The above rulings by the district court demonstrate a disregard for the role of the fact
finder in determining the credibility of evidence and the limited role of the court to act as a
gatekeeper. This disregard extends to the court's ruling concerning the complicity of the
Respondent in Dr. Allen's alleged negligence involving illicit drug abuse and in conducting the
surgery in the first instance.
Dr. Allen performed the surgical procedure at the Respondent Surgical Center. Dr. Allen
is a one-third owner of the Respondent. As a result of the Dr. Allen's negligence by conducting
the surgery, Harvey Wainio lost his leg to amputation because Dr. Allen conducted surgery on it,
and he eventually died.
The evidence in front of the district court demonstrated that the other owners of the
Respondent Surgical Center were aware of Dr. Allen's drug abuse for a significant period of time
before the surgical procedure at issue took place. Notwithstanding, they allowed Dr. Allen to
continue to surgically treat patients in the Respondent facility and did not take steps to confront
Dr. Allen on his drug abuse until after he a contract pharmacist for the facility discovered and
reported Dr. Allen. Furthermore, even after the report of Dr. Allen's Propofol abuse (for which
he was disciplined), neither the Respondent nor Dr. Allen reported Dr. Allen's 10 year history of
opiate abuse of some 45 tablets per day to state officials.
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B.

Course of Proceedings Below

The procedural history regarding admission of Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony, and
evidence of Defendant's drug abuse, began early in this litigation and was the subject of several
motions and discovery issues.
Neither Dr. Allen nor Respondent disclosed Dr. Allen's drug addiction, or their
knowledge of the same in discovery until after Appellants uncovered it through independent
investigation and moved to compel a second deposition of Dr. Allen. At that point, Appellants
engaged an expert, Dr. Wischmeyer, to evaluate the effect, if any, of Dr. Allen's drug use on his
negligent treatment of Mr. Wainio. Thereafter, Respondent and Dr. Allen continued to obstruct
access to, and prevent admissibility of, Dr. Allen's illicit drug use. R. p. 411.
On June 21, 2012, the district court heard argument on Dr. Allen's and the Respondent's
motion seeking a protective order preventing the discovery of any information related to Dr.
Allen's drug use. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that Appellants sought
discovery of information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
R. p. 328-331.
Respondent and Dr. Allen continued to obstruct the discovery of information related to
Dr. Allen's drug use. Each of the discovery matters resisted by the Respondent and Dr. Allen
resulted in the discovery of relevant evidence.

The evidence discovered supported Dr.

Wischmeyer' s testimony that Dr. Allen was under the influence of drugs at the time of the
alleged negligence.
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On January 10, 2013, the district court heard argument on Appellants' motion to compel
the depositions of Respondent's employees and Dr. Allen related to the discovery of Dr. Allen's
drug use. The district court compelled the depositions by written order entered on January 28,
2013. R. p. 516-17.
Appellants were forced to bring another discovery motion to compel the production of
Dr. Allen's dental records and the deposition of his dentist, Dr. Bengston. At the same hearing,
. the district court heard argument on Dr. Allen's motion to quash Appellants' subpoena duces
tecum to K-Mart pharmacy seeking Dr. Allen's prescription records. Once again, the district
court permitted the requested discovery, including production of the pharmacy records, by
written order on November 27, 2013. R. p. 1198-1202.
The district court heard argument on the Respondent's and Dr. Allen's motion in limine
on February 13, 2014, to prevent admission of any evidence of Dr. Allen's drug use, as well as
argument on another motion by Appellants to compel depositions. The district court again
compelled the depositions. R. p. 2254-59. The district court issued a written ruling on February
19, 2014, granting the Respondent's and Dr. Allen's motion in limine precluding evidence of Dr.
Allen's drug abuse. Id. Importantly, at the same time the district court considered the motion in
limine, it also considered the Respondent's and Dr. Allen's motions to strike the Affidavits of

Bea Shatto and Paul E. Wischmeyer, both of which were in support of Appellants' opposition to
the motion in limine and both of which supported an inference that Dr. Allen had relapsed at the
time of Mr. Wainio's surgery. The district court denied the motions to strike the Affidavits. Id.
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After the Court granted the Respondent's and Dr. Allen's motion in limine precluding the
admission of evidence of Dr. Allen's drug use at trial, the Respondent and Dr. Allen moved the
district court to prevent any further discovery of evidence related to Dr. Allen's drug use. At the
same time, Appellants moved to compel the depositions of Renee Corder, and Dr. Ozeran, one of
the members of the Respondent LLC, both of which had previously been compelled to occur by
the district court. The district comi denied the Respondent's and Dr. Allen's motion and once
again compelled the depositions. Id.
After the district court granted the Respondent's and Dr. Allen's motion in limine,
Appellants moved the district court for permission to appeal. The district court denied the motion
on February 25, 2014. R. pp. 2428-2431.
After conducting additional discovery permitted by the district court Appellants filed a
motion in limine seeking an order allowing the evidence of Dr. Allen's drug use. R. pp. 30303035. On November 6, 2014, the district court denied Appellants' motion in limine and again
ruled Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony inadmissible. Id. Appellants also moved the district court for
permission to appeal the court's ruling on their motion in limine, which was also heard on
November 6, 2014. Id. The district court denied Appellants' motion for permission to appeal. Id.
In addition to the issue of Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony, the Respondent brought a motion
for summary judgment seeking dismissal on the grounds that there was no question fact
regarding the agent-principal relationship between Dr. Allen and the Respondent. R. pp. 30373041. The Court granted the Respondent's motion for summary judgment by written ruling on
November 26, 2014, dismissing the Respondent from the case. Id.
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Thereafter the Appellants entered into a settlement agreement with Dr. Allen (R. pp.
3116-3119). As the district court had dismissed the Respondent on summary judgment, a final
judgment against the only remaining party had been entered (R. pp. 3120-3121 ).

C.

Statement of Facts
At all times relevant, Defendant Richard Allen was and is an Idaho licensed podiatrist

practicing podiatry in Lewiston, Idaho

(R. p. 1235), although Dr. Allen's license was on

probation a three year period beginning in October, 2010. R. p. 1410. Dr. Allen was also an
o\vner/member in Respondent Syringa Surgical Center, a limited liability company, with two
other members: Dr. Steven Ozeran and Dr. Ronald Alm. R. p. 2855. The purpose of Respondent
Syringa Surgical Center, LLC is to "own and operate a surgical center." R. p. 2857.
Harvey Wainio was first referred to Dr. Allen on January 4, 2010, by his primary care
physician, Dr. Sigler. R. p. 3058. At the initial consultation, among other things, Dr. Allen
allegedly evaluated Mr. Wainio's pedal pulses. R. p. 2003. Dr. Allen recommended surgery to
correct issues Mr. Wainio had with his right foot. R. p. 3058. There is no evidence that Dr.
Allen gave Mr. Wainio any other treatment options. R. p. 2904. Dr. Allen told Mr. Wainio he
needed surgery, it was a piece of cake, and that he had done over a hundred of them. R. p. 2904.
Mr. Wainio again saw Dr. Allen again as part of his pre-operative course on January 18,
2010. R. p. 3058. Dr. Allen's pre-operative history and physical again described the presence of
strong posterior tibial and dorsalis pedis pulses bilaterally. R. p. 2005.

At that time, Mr. Wainio

filled out a "patient information sheet" with the name "Syringa Surgery Center" at the top R. p.
2908; a "Patient's Rights and Responsibilities" document also with the name "Syringa Surgery
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Center" at the top, R. p. 2910; and a "consent" form again, with the name "Syringa Surgery
Center" at the top of the page. R. p. 2911. These documents were all signed by Mr. Wainio on
January 18, 2010, in Dr. Allen's office.
Dr. Allen's office was in the same building as Syringa Surgery Center, at 1630 23 rd
Avenue in Lewiston, Idaho. R. p. 2855; R. p. 2903.
The "patient information sheet" signed on January 18 in Dr. Allen's office indicated that
Syringa Surgical Center would submit claims to Mr. Wainio's insurance carrier and further, by
signing the document, Mr. Wainio agreed to pay all charges made by Syringa Surgical Center. R.
p. 2908. The "Patient's Rights and Responsibilities" document also provided by Dr. Allen's
office at the January 18 appointment, set forth Mr. Wainio's rights "while receiving care at
Syringa Surgical Center." R. p. 2910. The document also encouraged Mr. Wainio to contact the
Director of the surgical center if he had any questions or concerns regarding services or rights as
a patient within the Surgical Center and provided a phone number for Syringa Surgical Center.
Id.
The "consent" form that Mr. Wainio reviewed and signed in Dr. Allen's office contained
the same language as the "patient information sheet" regarding claims to insurance carriers and
Mr. Wainio's responsibility to pay the Surgical Center invoices. R. p. 2911. Further, the consent
form contained numerous consent provisions each naming the Surgical Center, rather than Dr.
Allen, as the party with whom Wainio consented. Id.
On January 21, 2010, Defendant Richard Allen performed an elective surgery on Mr.
Wainio's right foot in Syringa Surgical Center.

7

R. p. 3038.

There were three procedures

comprised of a right modified McBride bunionectomy, first metatarsal osteotomy with screw
fixation, and a second toe arthrodesis PIPJ. R. p. 2915; R. p. 212. Mr. Wainio signed a "Syringa
Surgery Center Consent for Operation, Anesthesia or Other Procedure" on the day of surgery
wherein the form stated: "/ am aware of my physicians' ownership in the surgery center and am

aware that I may have surgery or treatment performed at any other facility where my surgeon
has privileges." R. p. 2915. The previous consents, signed in Dr. Allen's office, did not have any
disclosures about Dr. Allen's ownership in Syringa. R. p. 2908-11.
Mr. Wainio was discharged with post-operative instructions that had both "Syringa
Surgical Center" and Dr. Allen's name at the top of the page. R. p. 2912. The post operative
instructions rendered advice about when to call "your doctor I on call representative". R. p.
2912.
On January 24, 2010, Mr. Wainio began displaying weakness, vomiting and bladder
incontinence. R. p. 2416. Pursuant to a 911 call, Mr. Wainio was taken to Syringa General
Hospital in Grangeville, for evaluation and stabilization.

R. p. 2416.

Mr. Wainio was

subsequently transferred to St. Mary's Hospital in Cottonwood, Idaho, for treatment of an
ischemic right foot. R. p. 2416.
After being stabilized at St. Mary's hospital, he was sent to Spokane on January 29, 2010.
Physicians at Inland Vascular Institute conducted an emergency vascular consult. R. p. 2417.
The damage to the right foot was significant enough that a right foot amputation was necessary.
R. 883. Ultimately, Mr. Wainio died on July 9, 2012. R. p. 461.
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Respondent is a member managed limited liability company. R. p. 2870. Each of the
three members, including Dr. Allen, has an equal voice in the management of the LLC. R. p.
2860. The LLC maintains and oversees the surgical center, and authorizes certain physicians,
including Dr. Allen, access to its premises, its medications (including drugs Dr. Allen abused)
and its surgical facilities.
Respondent's operating agreement recognizes that each of the three members has a full
time practice which utilizes the surgical center.

Pursuant to the operating agreement, each

member must maintain that full time practice as "it is in the Company's best interests."

R. p.

2864. A member who does not maintain his full time practice must sell his interest in Respondent
to the other members. R. p. 2864.
Any professional desiring to utilize Respondent to conduct surgeries must seek and obtain
the status of staff, and must abide by the medical staff bylaws and all rules and regulations put
into place by the board. R. p. 2871. Respondent had a number of policies, procedures, rules,
regulations and conditions that medical staff members are required to follow. R. p. 2877; R. p.
2894. Medical staff members are subject to discipline for everything from failure to maintain
patient safety to improperly completing medical records according to the Respondent's rules. R.
pp. 2884-2885.
Dr. Allen was at all times relevant authorized to perform surgeries at Respondent surgical
center. R. p. 2871. Dr. Allen was allowed to continue to operate on patients even after the
Respondent discovered Dr. Allen's significant drug abuse and violations of its own policies. R.
p. 2808.
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Appellants discovered that Dr. Allen had been disciplined by the Board of Podiatry due
to a drug abuse problem that came to the Board's attention just a few months prior to Mr.
Wainio's surgery, in October, 2009. R. p. 426. Dr. Allen entered into a stipulation and consent
order with the Idaho Board of Podiatry on September 15, 2010, regarding the admitted drug
abuse and violation of LC. § 54-608(2). R. p. 1429. The discipline arose as a result of Dr.
Allen's diversion and use of Propofol. R. p. 2128.

Dr. Allen was reported to the Board by a

contract pharmacist for Respondent. R. p. 2136. After being caught, Dr. Allen confessed to his
Propofol abuse. R. p. 2128.
Dr. Allen entered an inpatient treatment facility in Oregon in September, 2009. R. p.
302. Dr. Allen returned to his podiatry practice less than two weeks after discharge from
rehabilitation (R. p. 1418), which was less than two months before Mr. Wainio sought Dr.
Allen's care. R. p. 2003.
Although he did not confess to the Board of Podiatry, Dr. Allen was also addicted to
opiates. R. p. 2133. Dr. Allen testified in his deposition that he abused Hydrocodone during
2006 and 2007 until September 2009. R. p. 2787. According to Dr. Allen's 2009 inpatient
chemical history record in September, 2009, however, he had been taking 15-20 tablets of
Vicodin daily, as well as Darvocet daily for the previous 10 years. R. p. 2133. He also took
Tramadol daily and had been using Propofol for a year. R. p. 2133.
According to Dr. Allen, he diverted "about 20 prescriptions of Hydrocodone" that he
wrote for his Grandmother. R. p. 640. A fact he also did not share with the Board of Podiatry or
the Board of Pharmacy. He also wrote prescriptions for other people, whose empty bottles were
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found in Dr. Allen's wastebasket by the cleaning person, Renee Corder. R. pp. 2762-2763. Ms.
Corder spoke to both Dr. Allen's assistant Heidi Pritchett, who gave Dr. Allen permission to
divert a narcotics prescription in her name, and Dr. Ozeran who confirmed to Ms. Corder that he
was aware that Dr. Allen had abusing drugs. R. p. 2754; R. p. 2766.
Ms. Corder found used syringes on the counter in Dr. Allen's office bathroom during the
previous three years before she stopped cleaning his office in approximately October, 2009. R. p.
2755; R. pp. 2758-2759; 2766. She also found empty Propofol bottles in the wastebasket in Dr.
Allen's office. R. pp. 2755-2759; 2766.
In addition to the other methods of diverting medications from Respondent and others,
Dr. Allen would also have patients who had difficulty with pain medications bring those unused
medications to him to exchange for a different prescription. R. pp. 2836-2838.

Dr. Allen

admitted that he received Dilaudid by having a patient return it to him. R. p. 2791.
Ms. Corder expressed to Dr. Ozeran that she was very concerned that Dr. Allen had been
allowed to continue performing surgery at Syringa Surgical Center despite the fact that Dr.
Ozeran and others knew Dr. Allen was abusing drugs. R. p. 2767. Ms. Corder was very
concerned for Dr. Allen's patients. R. p. 2767. Ms. Corder stopped working for Dr. Allen in
October, 2009 because she believed that he was a drug addict. R. pp. 2752-2753.
Dr. Allen's wife and office manager, Sherri Allen, also had knowledge of Dr. Allen's
drug use three years prior to Dr. Allen attending rehabilitation in September, 2009. According to
Ms. Allen, Dr. Ozeran and Richard Snyder, Respondent's Director of Surgical Services, knew
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about Dr. Allen's drug use at least three years prior to Dr. Allen going to rehabilitation

111

September 2009. R. p. 2770.
Whether prescribed or not, Dr. Allen stated that he last used Hydrocodone in September
2009. R. p. 2788. However, Dr. Allen's statement of when he last used Hydrocodone was
incorrect. Dr. Allen was prescribed Hydrocodone by his dentist on multiple occasions after
September 2009 and after treating Mr. Wainio. R. pp. 2978-2981.

Dr. Allen had five

prescriptions for Hydrocodone between September, 2011, and February 12, 2012, despite his
claims to the contrary in his deposition of April 4, 2013. R. pp. 2980-2981.

D.

Standard of Review On Appeal

l.

Motion for Summary Judgment

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the
same as that of the district court in ruling upon the motion. Purvis v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
142 Idaho 213,215, 127 P.3d 116, 118 (2005); citing, Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho
473, 475-76, 150 P.3d 488, 490-91 (2002). Therefore, this Court reviews the record before the
district court, including the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, if any, to determine

de novo whether, after construing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonrnoving party,
there exist any genuine issues of material fact and whether the successful movant below was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; citing, Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37,
740 P.2d 1022 (1987); I.R.C.P. 56(c).
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2.

Motions Regarding Appellants' Expert Dr. Wischmeyer

The admissibility of evidence is committed to the district court's discretion and this Court
reviews such rulings for abuse of discretion. Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 15,
175 P.3d 172, 177 (2007). When evaluating whether the district court properly exercised its
discretion, this Court conducts, "a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific
choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id,
citing, Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000
(1991). When a district court commits an error of law while exercising its discretion on the
admissibility of evidence, this Court remands the matter back to the district court for appropriate
findings according to the correct law. Gem State, 145 Idaho at 15-16; citing, Miller v. Haller,
129 Idaho 345,351,924 P.2d 607, 613 (1996).
IV.
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether the district court erred when it granted summary judgment to

Syringa Surgical Center, LLC by:
1. Finding that Appellants did not allege any negligent conduct by Dr. Allen at the

time of or during Mr. Wainio' s surgery at Syringa Surgical Center;
2. Finding that Dr. Allen was not an actual or apparent agent of the Respondent
at the time that Dr. Allen negligently evaluated Harvey Wainio in his office
pre-operatively; and,
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3. Finding Syringa Surgical Center, LLC bore no independent liability arising
from evidence of its complicity with Dr. Allen's drug abuse.
B.

Whether the district court erred by striking the evidence of Appellant's

expert, Dr. Wischmeyer, regarding Dr. Allen's drug use by:
1. Creating a new evidentiary standard for the admissibility of expert testimony

contrary to the standard set forth by this Court in Nield v. Pocatello Health
Servs., Inc., 156 Idaho 802, 332 P.3d 714 (2014);
2. Creating a new evidentiary standard to measure the probative value of expert
testimony against the potential prejudice of such evidence; and,
3. Whether the district court's new standard for the admissibility of expert
testimony violated the Appellants' constitutional right to a trial by jury by
summarily weighing the factual evidence reserved for the trier of fact.

V.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED
JUDGMENT TO SYRINGA SURGICAL CENTER, LLC

SUMMARY

Whether Respondent Syringa Surgical Center, LLC (hereinafter "Respondent" or
"Syringa") is vicariously liable for the acts of Dr. Allen as its actual or apparent agent is an issue
of fact. Likewise, whether Respondent breached a duty independently, is also a question of fact.
In this matter, the district court either (I) weighed the conflicting evidence presented in the
summary judgment briefing and determined for itself the weight to be given to the evidence (a
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task that is improper on summary judgment); or (2) ignored the evidence that raises material
issues of fact regarding Respondent Syringa's liability for Dr. Allen's negligence.
1.

The District Court Erred By Finding That Appellants Asserted No
Negligent Conduct By Dr. Allen At The Time He Performed Mr.
Wainio's Surgery At Syringa Surgical Center.

In its Opinion and Order on Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, the district
court conceded that, if a principal/agent relationship existed between Respondent and Dr. Allen,
that Respondent could be vicariously liable for Dr. Allen's negligence. R. p. 3041.
The district court then found that an agency relationship could only exist in the context of
Dr. Allen's conduct as a medical staff member or owner of Respondent Syringa. R. p. 3041.
The court reasoned that, because Appellants did not allege that Dr. Allen was negligent in
performing the surgery, Respondent could not be held vicariously liable for Dr. Allen's conduct.
R. p. 3041. The district court's analysis is clearly erroneous.

The court in this case erred when it ruled that "[u]nder the facts in the record, Plaintiffs
have alleged no negligent conduct by Dr. Allen at any time on the day of, or during, the surgical
procedure itself."

R. p. 3040.

What the district court failed to acknowledge is that the

Appellants not only alleged Dr. Allen's negligence pre-operatively, but also alleged Dr. Allen's
negligence in conducting the surgery on January 21, 2010, in the first instance. R. p. 502. That
negligence is imputed to Respondent because Dr. Allen was either an actual or apparent agent of
Respondent at the time he performed the surgery.
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a.

Appellants Asserted Facts Showing Dr. Allen's Negligence in Conducting the
Surgery in the First Instance.

The district court, while conceding that Respondent could be vicariously liability for Dr.
Allen's negligent conduct in the context of his role as a medical staff member or owner, granted
summary judgment to Respondent on that point because "Plaintiffs have alleged no negligent
conduct by Dr. Allen at any time on the day of, or during, the surgical procedure itself." R.
3040. The court is simply wrong.
Appellants contend and the evidence shows, that adequate blood flow must be present in
order to allow for adequate healing post surgery. It follows that if there is insufficient
vascularity in the foot to assure sufficient healing post surgery, conducting the surgery in any
event is negligent. R. p. 3050.
In its first amended complaint at paragraph 2.8, Appellants alleged as follows:
At the time that Mr. Wainio was seen at Inland Vascular Institute, an arteriogram
was performed which demonstrated a complete occlusion of the right SF A from
its origin to the level of the popliteal artery down the leg. This included complete
occlusion of the peroneal artery's anterior tibial artery and posterior tibial artery.
Circulation to the foot preoperatively was by way of collateral circulation
established over a lengthy period of time which was insufficient to perfuse the
foot post surgery for healing and would not have presented or mimicked pedal
pulses. Mr. Wainio was not a surgical candidate for the surgery Defendant
Richard M. Allen performed until such time appropriate arterial circulation was
re-established.
R. p. 500

Appellants further alleged:
3.2.
Defendant Dr. Richard M. Allen individually and as an agent, employee
and/or servant of Syringa Surgical Center, negligently, recklessly and tortiously
failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice in the community in
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which the care was provided as such standard existed at the time and place of said
negligent, reckless and tortious conduct; he failed to exercise the degree of skill,
care and learning expected of a reasonably prudent medical provider of like
medical and health services in said community in the State of Idaho acting in the
same or similar circumstances at the time of the care and treatment provided to
Harvey Wainio.
R. p. 502
Pursuant to the principle that Idaho is a "notice pleading" state, Appellants are only
required to indicate some theory of recovery supporting the relief sought. Brown v. City of
Pocatello. 148 Idaho 802, 229 P.2d 1164 (2010). The theory of recovery in this case is that Dr.
Allen was negligent and breached the standard of care by performing the surgery at all.
Respondent is liable because Dr. Allen was either an actual or apparent agent when he performed
the surgery. Both of those theories of liability are clearly set forth in Appellants' pleading.
Additionally, at hearing on the matter, Appellants' counsel made clear that Appellants' claims
include a failure of the standard of care for performing the surgery in the first place:
Defendant re-characterizes Plaintiffs' case to favor this argument they have made
by parsing out only the failure to appreciate pulses as the only act of negligence;
of course, it's not. The Plaintiffs allege and assert that it was negligent to do the
surgery at Syringa Surgical Center because this was not a surgical candidate. The
surgery shouldn't have been done. He didn't have -- Mr. Wainio did not have the
requisite pulses in the lower extremity. So conducting the surgery is negligent and
that's always been the issue in this case; and it's no different. And that was done
today and that was done at Syringa Surgical Center.
November 6, 2014, Summary Judgment Hearing, Tr. p. 213.
The district court's assertion that the Appellants did not allege negligence on the day of,
or during, the surgery is simply incorrect. The district court erred and the case should be
remanded for further proceedings.
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b.

There is a Material Issue of Fact Whether Dr. Allen was an Actual or
Apparent Agent of Respondent at the Time of the Surgery.

The existence of an agency relationship is a question of fact to be resolved from the
evidence by the jury. American West Enterprises, Inc. v. CNH, LLC, 155 Idaho 746, 316 P.3d
662 (2013); Adkison Corp. v. American Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 690 P.2d 341 (1984)
citing Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 501 P.2d 278 (1972). An agency is a relationship resulting

from "the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf
and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." Restatement (Second) of Agency§
1, at 7 (1958). Herbst v. Bothof Dairies, Inc. 110 Idaho 971, 719 P.2d 1231 (Ct.App. 1986).

It is black letter law that a principal who conducts an activity through his agent is subject
to liability for the agent's conduct. Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 796 P.2d 506
(1990), citing Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497, 708 P.2d 900, 902 (1985); and Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 251 (1958). See also Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 7.05 (2006).A
principal is liable for the acts of the agent when an actual agency relationship exists, and the
principal has conferred express or implied authority. See Caballero v. Wikse, 140 Idaho 329,
332, 92 P.3d 1076, 1079 (2004).
An express grant of authority means that the principal has directed the agent accordingly.
An implied grant of authority is that which is conferred by the principal to the agent that is usual
and necessary to carry out the objectives of the principal.

Caballero v. Wikse, 140 Idaho at

332, 92 P.3d at 1079. Indicia of an express agency relationship "does not have to be established
by direct or positive proof, but may be inferred from dealings, circumstances, acts and conduct."
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Id. The "dealings, circumstances, acts and conduct," in combination with the inferences, will
suppo1i a finding of express actual authority. Caballero v. Wikse, 140 Idaho at 332, 92 P.3d at
1079.
In this case, Respondent conferred actual authority on Dr. Allen to act on its behalf in

conducting surgeries in its facilities, and to earn a profit for the facility. Dr. Allen is a member
of the LLC whose purpose is to operate a surgical center for a profit. R. p. 2877.
Respondent Syringa is a member managed limited liability company. R. p. 2860. Dr.
Allen is a member with two others and, thus, a manager. R. p. 2860. Pursuant to LC. § 30-6-407
certain authority to act on behalf of the LLC is conferred.
(2) In a member-managed limited liability company, as among the members, the
following rules apply:
(a) The management and conduct of the company are vested in the members.
(b) Each member has equal rights in the management and conduct of the
company's activities.
(c) A difference arising among members as to a matter in the ordinary course of
the activities of the company may be decided by a majority of the members.
(d) An act outside the ordinary course of the activities of the company may be
undertaken only with the consent of all members.
(e) The operating agreement may be amended only with the consent of all
members.
LC. § 30-6-407(2)
Only a member of the medical staff may admit patients to Respondent. R. p. 2895. In
order to conduct surgeries at Respondent, a member must become a member of the medical staff.
R. p. 2895. Becoming a member of the medical staff requires consent to be bound by the staff

bylaws, and rules and regulations of Respondent, which includes controlling the way in which a
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member treats his patients, performs surgeries, and maintains medical and patient records. R. p.
2871; 2895.
All members of the Medical Staff must agree to abide by the policies, Bylaws,
Rules and Regulations of the Organization.
R. p. 2895 (emphasis added.)
The purposes of the medical staff are set forth in Article II, Section 1 of the Staff
Bylaws:
Section 1 Purposes.
The purposes of the Staff are:
a. To be the formal organizational structure through which (1) the benefits of
membership on the Staff may be obtained by individual Practitioners and (2) the
obligations of Staff membership may be fulfilled;
b. To serve as the primary means for accountability to the Board for the
appropriateness of the professional performance and ethical conduct of its
members and affiliates and to strive toward patient care in the Surgical Center that
meets the standard of health care practice applicable to communities of essentially
the same size and nature of Lewiston, Idaho, with consideration of health care
facilities usually available in such communities;
c. To provide an appropriate educational setting that will maintain scientific
standards and that will lead to continuous advancement in professional knowledge
and skill of the Surgical staff;
d. To provide a means whereby issues concerning Staff and Surgical Center may be
discussed by the Staff with the Board and the Administrator.

R. p. 2878.
At all relevant times Dr. Allen was part of the Medical Staff and subject to Respondent's
rules, regulations and bylaws, including potential corrective action by Respondent. R. p. 28792882. Respondent controlled the administration of surgical services performed by Dr. Allen at
the Respondent facility. R. p. 2871.
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The rules and regulations set forth a number of controls on the conduct of the medical
staff and the way in which patient care is performed. Some examples are that the "attending
practitioner" will only be allowed to schedule procedures that are identified on their case list and
which have been approved by the Governing Body. R. p. 2895. Patients may only be discharged
by a written order when discharge criteria have been met. R. p. 2896. All medical staff must
also adhere to a separate set of policies and procedures set forth in the facility policy and
procedure manuals that "may be reviewed in the Administrator's office." R. p. 2900.
Medical staff bylaws require annual application to remain a part of medical staff. The
bylaws also require attendance at Medical Staff meetings. Respondent supplies the drugs for use
by the medical staff and it instituted policies related to drugs to which all medical staff must
adhere. R. p. 2873-2874.
There are sufficient facts for the trier of fact to find that Dr. Allen was acting on behalf of
Respondent, promoting Respondent's best interests, and was subject to Respondent's control
when he conducted the surgery on Mr. Wainio on January 21, 2010. Dr. Allen's negligence in
conducting the surgery is imputed to Respondent.

The district court's grant of summary

judgment should be reversed and the case remanded.
2.

The District Court Erred By Finding That Dr. Allen Was Not An
Actual Or Apparent Agent Of The Respondent At The Time That Dr.
Allen Negligently Evaluated Harvey Wainio Pre-Surgically.

The district court erroneously found that Appellants' claims against Respondent fail
because there were no facts to show there was an agency relationship between Dr. Allen and
Respondent at the time he examined Mr. Wainio and erroneously palpated pedal pulses. R. p.
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3041. The district court further erroneously found that "any agency relationship that exists
between Syringa and Dr. Allen is limited to Dr. Allen's conduct as a medical staff member or
owner of Syringa." R. p. 3041. The court completely ignores the indicia of apparent authority in
this context. At the time that Mr. Wainio consulted with Dr. Allen in his office on January 4 and
January 18, Dr. Allen was cloaked with the authority of Respondent.
Apparent authority does not presuppose the existence of an actual agency relationship. 1
Jones v. Healthsouth Treasure Vallev Hospital, 147 Idaho 109, 113, 206 P.3d 473, 477 (2009).
Apparent authority applies to "any set of circumstances" under which it is reasonable for a third
party to believe that an agency has authority, so long as the belief is traceable to the
manifestation of the principal. Id.
In the case of Jones v. Healthsouth Treasure Valley Hospital, this Court made it clear that
the doctrine of apparent agency creates tort liability on the part of a principal for its agent's
conduct even when there is no actual agency relationship. Jones v. Healthsouth Treasure Valley
Hospital, 147 Idaho at 114,206 P.3d at 478.
This Court, in expressly adopting the doctrine of apparent authority to impute tort
liability to a principal, held:
Under section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, liability is imputed to a
principal 'who employs an independent contractor to perform services for another
which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by
the employer or by his servants .... ' Id at § 429. When determining
liability ... when an agency relationship is alleged, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts defers to the Restatement of Agency. Id at§ 429, comment c. Section 2.03
1 The

terms "apparent authority" and "apparent agency" may be used interchangeably. Jones v.
Healthsouth Treasure Valley Hospital, 147 Idaho at 113,206 P.3d at 477.
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of the Restatement (Third) of Agency defines 'apparent authority' as 'the power
held by an agent or other actor to affect a principal's legal relations with third
parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on
behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal's
manifestations.' Restatement (Third) of Agency, § 2.03 (2006). The rationale for
imposing liability under apparent authority is so '[a] principal may not choose to
act through agents whom it has clothed with the trappings of authority and then
determine at a later time whether the consequence of their acts offers an
advantage.' Id at § 2.03, comment c.
Jones v. Healthsouth Treasure Valley Hospital, 147 Idaho 109, 113,114,206 P.3d 473,477,478
(2009).
In the Jones case, Mrs. Jones was scheduled to undergo lumbar spine surgery. There
were two hospitals from which to choose for the surgery. Mrs. Jones chose Treasure Valley
Hospital. As part of the procedure, her physician elected to have Mrs. Jones's blood "salvaged"
during surgery. The process required that blood be collected :from the patient intra-operatively
and made available for reinfusion into the patient's body using a cell saver machine. Id. At 111,
475. Mrs. Jones' physician placed the order for the services. Independent contractors, through
another company, were engaged to perform the services. Id. One of the contractors conducting
the procedure placed a pressure cuff on the infusion bag to make the process go more quickly.
Id. Placement of the pressure cuff was in contravention of the instructions for the process. The
pressure cuff eventually squeezed the air from the bag into Mrs. Jones' body causing a fatal air
embolism. Id.
The plaintiffs sued the hospital under the theory of apparent authority for the negligence
of the contractor who was infusing Mrs. Jones. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the hospital, and the plaintiffs appealed. This Court held that the hospital could be
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vicariously liable for Dr. Jenkins' negligence, even though she was a contractor and not an actual
agent of the hospital. The Jones case extended the doctrine of apparent agency to medical
malpractice cases in Idaho, including negligent physicians:
TVH contends that a more reasonable inference is that the legislature intended
that a hospital could be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior rather than the doctrine of apparent authority. However, there is no
language in the statute limiting the basis from which vicarious liability claims
may be made. Idaho Code § 6-1012 states that a claimant may bring an action
against a healthcare provider or any person vicariously liable for the provider's
negligence. Although the term "vicarious liability" is not defined under the Act, it
is defined generally as "[l]iability that a supervisory party bears for the actionable
conduct of a subordinate or associate based on the relationship between the two
parties." Blacks Law Dictionary 934 (8th ed.2004). Section 429 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which imposes tort liability to a principal under
the doctrine of apparent agency, states as follows:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for another
which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by
the employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for physical harm caused by
the negligence of the contractor in supplying such services, to the same extent as
though the employer were supplying them himself or by his servants.
Restatement (Second) of Torts 429 (1965). Pursuant to this section, the hospitals
liability arises out of the apparent agency relationship it creates with its
independent contractor and thus falls under the definition of vicarious liability.
Furthermore, the Restatement (Third) of Agency specifically states that a
principal is vicariously liable for a tort committed by an agent acting with
apparent authority. Restatement (Third) of Agency 7.08 (2006). As such, we find
that the extension of apparent agency to medical malpractice claims is consistent
with the Acts provision for vicarious liability.

Jones v. Healthsouth Treasure Valley Hospital, 147 Idaho 109, 115,206 P.3d 473,479 (2009).
In this case, just as in the Jones case, Dr. Allen had all of the trappings of authority. Mr.
Wainio was referred to Dr. Allen by another physician. R. p. 2903. Dr. Allen's office is in the
same building directly below Syringa. Allen's office and Syringa are connected by a stairwell.
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R. p. 2903. There is no evidence that Dr. Allen gave Mr. Wainio any meaningful option of
where his surgery would take place.

R. p. 2907. The consent form disclosing Dr. Allen's

interest in Syringa, and purportedly giving Mr. Wainio a choice of where he wanted Dr. Allen to
perform the surgery, was not signed until 7:30 a.m. on the day of surgery. R. p. 2915-2916.
The consent and patient rights and responsibilities documents that Mr. Wainio signed in
Dr. Allen's office on January 18, 2010, are from "Syringa Surgery Center" at the top. See R. pp.
2908, 2910, 2911. The consent form lumps the services of the Surgery Center and the physician
together, making Dr. Allen and the Respondent indistinguishable:
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:
[ ... ]AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE
INFORMATION: I herby (sic) authorize my physician to give my insurance
company or company's (sic) any and all information they may require concerning
my case, and agree to pay all charges made by Syringa Surgery Center regarding
services rendered to me ...
R. p. 2911
FOR MEDICARE PATIENTS: I request payment of authorized Medicare
benefits to me, or in my behalf, for any services furnished to me by or at Syringa
Surgery Center, including physician services ....
R. p. 291 l(emphasis added).
Dr. Allen told Mr. Wainio he needed surgery and that the surgery would be a "piece of
cake." R. p. 2904. Dr. Allen also told Mr. Wainio that he had done hundreds of these surgeries.
R. p. 2905.
Dr. Allen had a duty to Respondent a member of the LLC to maintain an active medical
practice that utilizes the surgical center in order to make a profit for the center:
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Section 10.6A. Obligation to Sell Upon Winding Down of Practice. Each of the
Members who are parties to this Agreement at the time of execution, have an
active medical practice which utilizes the Company's surgical center. The
Members believe that it is in the best interests of the Company that all
Members ... should be operating full time medical practices. Therefore if a
Member is no longer operating a full time medical practice for any reason
whatsoever, the Member shall be obligated to sell his interest, and the company
and/or the other Members shall be obligated to purchase said interest. ..
R. p. 2864. Thus, Dr. Allen's activities were directly for the advancement of, and specifically
related to, the objectives of Respondent.
Finally, the post-operative instructions given to Mr. Wainio after surgery have both
Syringa Surgical Center and Dr. Richard Allen's name at the top. R. p. 2912. The form does not
distinguish Respondent from Dr. Allen. At the bottom of the form is the pre-printed telephone
number of "your physician," presumably, the telephone number is Dr. Allen's. R. p. 2912.
Just as in the Jones case, there were circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to
believe that Allen was an agent for Respondent. Dr. Allen's office was in the same building as
the surgical center (Mr. Wainio testified that Dr. Allen's office was "in the surgical center, down
below it" R. p. 2903). Dr. Allen had Mr. Wainio sign Respondent's forms in his office and then
maintained those forms. There is no evidence that Dr. Allen gave Mr. Wainio a meaningful
choice of where the surgery would be performed. It was reasonable for Mr. Wainio to draw the
conclusion that Dr. Allen was an agent of Respondent at the time that Dr. Allen examined Mr.
Wainio on January 4 and January 18, 2010, preoperatively.
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3.

The District Court Erred By Finding Respondent Bore No
Independent Liability Arising From Evidence Of Its Knowledge of
and Tolerance For Dr. Allen's Drug Abuse.

In its ruling on summary judgment in favor of Respondent, the Court determined that
evidence Appellants relied upon to show that Respondent should be vicariously liable for the
negligence of Dr. Allen was based upon evidence it had already ruled inadmissible. In footnote
5 of its Opinion and Order on Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment the Court held:
In their brief opposing Syringa's Motion, Plaintiffs rely on evidentiary facts the
Court has ruled inadmissible to support their assertion a principal-agent
relationship exists that makes Syringa vicariously liable. The court's analysis,
however, cannot take into account any inadmissible evidence.
R. p. 3040.

The question then, is whether the facts relied upon by Appellants that are referred to in
Footnote 5 are in fact inadmissible, or whether the district court erred when it found that the
evidence of Dr. Allen's illicit drug use which was known to Respondent, should have been
considered by the district court when ruling upon summary judgment.
Appellants alleged Respondent's negligence in their first amended complaint as follows:
2.11. Defendant Syringa Surgical Center, LLC, had an independent duty to
monitor its agents and to assure its doctors, including Dr. Allen, were unimpaired
and competent to meet the applicable standard in the care and treatment of Harvey
Wainio. The applicable standard of care at the time and place included, but was
not limited to, reasonably assuring Dr. Allen was not under the influence of, or
affected by, any substance that would impair his ability to provide medical care
and treatment to Harvey Wainio. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant Syringa Surgical Center, LLC, breached this duty.
2.12. Defendant Syringa Surgical Center, LLC, had a duty to monitor its drug
inventory to assure that its drugs were not being improperly misused by its agents,
employees or physicians. It further had a duty to take adequate and reasonable
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precautions to maintain the safety and security of its drugs upon discovery that an
agent, employee, or physician has misused its drugs.
R. p. 501

It is an issue of fact whether Dr. Allen was impaired at the time he conducted surgery on Mr.
Wainio. Therefore, it is also an issue of fact whether Respondent is vicariously liable for Dr.
Allen's negligence by its failure to maintain the security of its medications, particularly when it
knew Dr. Allen was diverting Propofol and had been for quite some time. R. p. 2770.

As

1s

discussed more fully in Section B below, the Court improperly weighed the evidence regarding
whether Dr. Allen had relapsed when he conducted the surgery on Mr. Wainio. Thus, the Court
improperly excluded evidence of Dr. Allen's drug diversion and use.
According to Renee Corder, Dr. Ozeran, a member of respondent and appointment
medical director, knew about Dr. Allen's drug use. R. pp. 2921-2922. Dr. Ozeran admitted he
knew of Dr. Allen's drug use for about a year. R. p. 2924. Sherri Allen's contemporaneous
journal notes indicate Dr. Ozeran knew for three years prior to September, 2009. R. p. 2770.
In any event, Respondent violated its own policies, procedures, regulations and bylaws
by allowing Dr. Allen to continue to conduct surgery with a known drug problem; and by
allowing access to the drugs that Dr. Allen was abusing.
Respondent negligently monitored and misused its medications when Dr. Allen diverted
Propofol and other drugs for his own use. Further, Respondent was negligent by not assuring Dr.
Allen had the requisite skill and ability to perform surgeries, particularly under his drug-infused
state during 2009 and, Appellants contend, 2010. Renee Corder herself expressed this concern
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based upon the type and volume of drugs she found in Dr. Allen's possess10n, including
Propofol, likely taken from the Respondent. R. pp. 2918-2919.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY STRIKING THE EVIDENCE OF
APPELLANTS' EXPERT, DR. WISCHMEYER, REGARDING DR. ALLEN'S
DRUG USE

Prior to holding Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony inadmissible, the district court weighed
evidence, criticized Dr. Wischmeyer for not considering evidence the district court believed
indicated Dr. Allen had not relapsed, afforded defense witnesses undue credibility, and
questioned the reliability of witnesses Dr. Wischmeyer relied upon. By doing so, the district
court created a new standard for the admissibility of expert testimony and determining whether
the probative value of evidence is outweighed by its prejudice. As a result, the district court
committed an error of law and this Court should remand this matter back to the district court for
findings regarding the admissibility of Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony according to the proper
standards, set forth below.
1.

The District Court Erred In Creating A New Evidentiary Standard
For The Admissibility Of Expert Testimony Contrary To The
Standard Set Forth By This Court In Nield V. Pocatello Health Servs.,
Inc., 156 Idaho 802,332 P.3d 714 (2014).

In Nield v. Pocatello Health Servs., Inc., 156 Idaho 802,332 P.3d 714, (2014), this Court

set forth the standard for the admissibility of expert testimony. Expert testimony is admissible if,
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue." I.R.E. 702; see also Nield, 156 Idaho at 816. "The
foundation for the admission of opinion testimony based upon scientific knowledge includes
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both that the witness is an expert in the field and that there is a scientific basis for the expert's
opinion." Swallow v. Emergency Med. of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 593, 67 P.3d 68 (2003);
citing State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 908 P.2d 566 (1995); see also Nield, 156 Idaho at 816. In

order to determine the admissibility of expert testimony, the court should evaluate, "the expert's
ability to explain pertinent scientific principles and to apply those principles to the formulation of
his or her opinion." Id.
The court should act as a gatekeeper rather than a fact finder in determining the
admissibility of expert testimony. Id, at 811; see also United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472
F.3d 645, 654 (9th Cir. 2006). Determining the admissibility of expert testimony is not an
adversarial process. Id. The court should not weigh the credibility of the facts forming the basis
of the expert's opinion, but rather, should only consider whether the facts, if taken as true,
support the expert's testimony rendering it admissible. Id. An expert's ultimate conclusion is not
determinative of admissibility; rather it is the legitimacy of the expert's reasoning and
methodology. Id, at 816; citing Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140, 219 P.3d 453, 464
(2009).
In evaluating the admissibility of an expert's testimony, the court should not weigh the
testimony of the expert against other witnesses or make determinations as to the credibility of the
expert, rather the expert's opinion should be judged on its own merits against the requirements of
I.RE. 702. Nield, 156 Idaho at 816. Further, an expert is not required to address every possibility
and opinion offered by the defense. Id. Expert testimony that rises above speculation and is
based upon facts in the record is admissible because it is helpful to the trier of fact. Id, at 816-18.
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The Nield case is instructive on the standard to be applied by a district court in
determining the admissibility of expert testimony. In Nield, this Court concluded that a district
court exceeded its authority, becoming a fact finder rather than gatekeeper, and held that the
expert testimony was admissible and credibility issues regarding the expert's testimony were the
within the province of the jury. Nield, 156 Idaho at 816-18. In determining that the district court
had exceeded its authority, this Court noted that the Appellants' expert had reviewed a number of
medical records and derived his opinions from the facts in the records along with his own
medical knowledge and experience. Id; see also United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d
645, 655 (9th Cir. 2006)(explaining that medical knowledge is often complex and uncertain, the
standard for admissibility of testimony from a physician is thus whether other physicians would
accept it as reliable, a determination as to the credibility of the testimony should be left to the
jury).
Further, this Court explained that it is not necessary for a party to prove a specific issue
by direct and positive evidence, rather it is only necessary that the party show a chain of
circumstances from which the specific issue is reasonably and naturally inferable. Nield, 156
Idaho at 816-18.
In the instant case, the district court unquestionably exceeded its authority in determining
the admissibility of evidence of Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony, becoming a fact finder, rather than
gatekeeper. The district court created its own standard for admissibility, which included
weighing the credibility of evidence and comparing Appellants' expert, Dr. Wischmeyer' s,
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opinions to evidence presented by the defense, in direct conflict with the standard set f01ih in
Nield.
Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony that Dr. Allen was more probably than not under the
influence of drugs at the time he provided negligent treatment to Mr. Wainio, and the evidence
supportive thereof, was first considered by the district court in Dr. Allen's Motion in limine. R.
p. 2254-59. Dr. Allen moved to strike the Affidavits of Beatrice L. Shatto (Mrs. Shatto) and Dr.
Wischmeyer, submitted by Appellants to provide the foundation for Dr. Wischmeyer' s testimony
that the Defendant was more probably than not under the influence of drugs at the time m
question. Id.
Importantly, prior to ruling on Dr. Allen's motion in limine, the district court denied the
motion to strike the Affidavits, noting, " ... the Court finds it may be necessary to consider the
affidavits in order to rule on Defendant Allen's Motion in limine ... " R. p. 2255. The district
court set forth the evidence submitted by the Appellants which provided the foundation for Dr.
Wischmeyer's ultimate opinion that Dr. Allen had relapsed and was under the influence of drugs.
R. p. 2257. The district court noted that Mrs. Shatto stated in her Affidavit that, "Dr. Allen

seemed overly happy, his eyes seemed glimmery, and his depth perception appeared impaired,"
and Dr. Wischmeyer stated that the fact that Dr. Allen was able to palpate pedal pulses in Mr.
Wainio when it was impossible to do so supported his conclusion that Dr. Allen was under the
influence of drugs at the time he provided care to Mr. Wainio. Id.
Despite considering the Affidavits, the district court went on to state, "In the instant
matter, the Court finds no evidence to support Plaintiffs' theory that Dr. Allen likely relapsed in
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January 2010." R. p. 2256. The district court then recited the evidence presented by Dr. Allen
and the Respondent in support of their contention that evidence of Dr. Allen's drug use should be
struck. R. p. 2256-57.
After weighing the evidence presented by the parties, the district court ruled that Dr.
Wischmeyer's testimony was inadmissible. R. p. 2259. Despite the evidence from Mrs. Shatto's
and Dr. Wischmeyer's Affidavits, the district court stated:
[P]laintiffs have presented no evidence Dr. Allen was under the influence of any
drugs in January 2010 when Dr. Allen says he palpated pedal pulse in Wainio's
right foot. Rather, Plaintiffs' theory rests solely on Dr. Wischmeyer's conjecture
and speculation that Allen likely relapsed, despite the absence of adequate factual
evidence upon which such a conclusion could lie.
R. p. 2257. In support of its ruling, the district court explained, "The Court is not persuaded that

an adequate foundation with sufficient reliability has been laid for the expert opinion that a
factual event, relapse, occurred." Id [emphasis added]. Additionally, the district court agreed
with the Respondent and Dr. Allen that not one of the witnesses expressed concern with Dr.
Allen's post-rehabilitation behavior or treatment of patients, and that Dr. Allen's drug tests were
all negative. Id.
The only conclusion that can be reached, based upon the district court's own statements,
is that the district court weighed the evidence presented by the parties, including comparing Dr.
Wischmeyer' s testimony to the testimony of other witnesses, and faulting Dr. Wischmeyer for
not considering certain facts, even though he addressed those facts. The district court questioned
the credibility of the evidence Dr. Wischmeyer relied upon and found it unsatisfactory, which
was a clear violation of the standard for admissibility of expert testimony set forth in Nield.
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The district court considered, for a second time, the admissibility of Dr. Wischmeyer's
testimony in Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine Re Drug Use and Motion for Permissive Appeal. R. p.
3030-35. At the outset of its ruling, the district court stated that Dr. Wischmeyer was qualified as
an expert on the subject of physician drug abuse, that his opinions were supported by peer
reviewed studies, and that the district court's ruling was based solely on the court's belief he
lacked a factual foundation for his testimony. R. p. 3032-33.
The district court also found that Appellants sought admission of evidence that Dr. Allen
had relapsed despite "Dr. Allen having completed drug rehabilitation and despite monitoring
safeguards in place to detect any drug use at the time he was treating Harvey Wainio ... " R. p.
3031 [emphasis added]. The district court added that it had previously ruled Dr. Wischmeyer's
testimony inadmissible because it had determined there was inadequate foundation for the
testimony. Id.

In support of its ruling, the district court explained, " ... the Court must examine the basis
on which Dr. Wischmeyer reaches his factual conclusion." R. p. 3033. Once again, in direct
contravention of the Nield case, the district court faulted Dr. Wischmeyer for not considering
evidence tending to suggest Dr. Allen had not relapsed, clearly ignoring those portions of Dr.
Wischmeyer's Affidavits addressing the inadequacy of Dr. Allen's inpatient drug rehab stay, and
drug testing. R. p. 3034. Further, such criticism of Dr. Wischmeyer's opinions required the
district court to improperly compare his opinions to the evidence submitted by the Respondent
and Dr. Allen. Id.
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The district court stated Dr. Wischmeyer was not relying upon reliable evidence in
reaching his conclusions, a clear and improper commentary on the evidence upon which Dr.
Wischmeyer relied. R. p. 3032-33 [emphasis added]. In support of this contention, the district
court criticized Dr. Wischmeyer for trusting the accuracy of Mrs. Shatto's statements that Dr.
Allen seemed overly happy, his eyes seemed glimmery, and his depth perception appeared
impaired. R. p. 3034. Finally, the district court acknowledged there were issues with Dr. Allen's
drug testing and its reliability, despite earlier in its ruling stating the drug testing proved Dr.
Allen was not under the influence of drugs at the time he treated Mr. Wainio. Id. Dr. Allen was
regularly drug testing while he was also admittedly taking Hydrocodone for dental pain. R. pp.
2988-2996.
The district court's orders regarding the admissibility of Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony
clearly indicate that the district court created its own standard for the admissibility of expert
testimony rather than employing the standard set forth in the Nield case. The standard created by
the district court here empowers courts, rather than juries, to weigh the credibility of evidence
and find for plaintiffs or defendants. The standard created by the district court invades the
province of the jury. In the criminal justice context, this improper standard would empower a
court rather than a jury, to determine guilt or innocence in cases where criminal activity can only
be proved by expert testimony, because the court is able to weigh the credibility of evidence
relied upon by an expert, prior to admitting expert testimony on the issue.
Under the standard created by the district court, the court, rather than a jury, could make
the determination of guilt or innocence unless there was concrete evidence of criminal activity,
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evidence which may be absent in criminal cases. For instance, if a court were permitted to weigh
the credibility of evidence in order to determine the admissibility of expert testimony, the court
could consider the credibility of statements by victims of child molestation prior to determining
the admissibility of expert testimony on that issue. Where the victim is too young or mentally
incompetent and unable to testify, expert testimony may be the only evidence available to the
prosecution. In such a scenario, the comi, rather than the jury, would be determining the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. This scenario demonstrates why the standard for review applied by
the district court in this case should be rejected.
Under the Nield case, the district court was required to assume that the facts forming the
basis for Dr. Wischmeyer' s opinion were true and make the determination whether those facts
provided the foundation for Dr. Wischmeyer's opinions. Nield, 156 Idaho at 811. Additionally,
the district court was not permitted to compare the evidence relied upon by Dr. Wischmeyer to
evidence provided by the Respondent and Dr. Allen. The district court was not permitted to
require that Dr. Wischmeyer consider certain evidence proffered by the Respondent and Dr.
Allen. Id at 816. Nonetheless, the district court did just that.
As a result, the district comi abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard
for the admissibility of expert testimony. Therefore, Appellants respectfully request the Court
reverse the district court's ruling holding Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony inadmissible and remand
this matter back to the district court for a determination of the admissibility of Dr. Wischmeyer' s
testimony according to the proper standard set forth in Nield.
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2.

The District Court Erred In Creating A New Evidentiary Standard
To Measure The Probative Value Of Expert Testimony Against The
Potential Prejudice Of Such Evidence.

The district court also created an improper standard for evaluating whether the probative
value of Dr. Wischmeyer' s testimony was outweighed by unfair prejudice of the evidence
because, again, the district court weighed the credibility of the foundation for and even Dr.
Wischmeyer's testimony itself, in ruling the evidence inadmissible under I.R.E 403. Evidence is
not "unfairly prejudicial" merely because it is detrimental to the opposing party's case; nearly all
evidence offered against a party is detrimental and therefore prejudicial to their case. State v.
Floyd, 125 Idaho 651,654, 873 P.2d 905 (1994).
In order to be "unfairly prejudicial" the evidence must suggest to the jury that they decide
the case on an improper basis. Id. citing Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 1981).
"Unfairly prejudicial" evidence is evidence that harms a party "not because of inferences that can
reasonably be drawn from the facts, but because it inflames the jury and rouses them to
'overmastering hostility'." State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 88,785 P.2d 647,652 (Ct. App. 1989)
Although this Court has not considered whether a court may weigh the credibility of
evidence prior to engaging in the I.RE. 403 balancing test, federal courts have expressly rejected
considering the credibility of evidence prior to engaging in the test. "Weighing probative value
against unfair prejudice under [Rule] 403 means probative value with respect to a material fact if
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the evidence is believed, not the degree the court finds it believable.2" United States v. Evans,

728 F.3d 953, 963 (9th Cir. 2013); citing 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice &
Procedure: Evidence, § 5214, at 265-66 (l978)(internal citation omitted)[emphasis added].
Conflicts in evidence go the weight, not admissibility of evidence. Evans, 728 F.3d at 963;
quoting United States v. Candoli, 870 F.2d 496,509 (9th Cir. 1989).
A court may not exclude or discount relevant evidence on the basis that the court does not
find the evidence credible. Evans, 728 F.3d at 963. Evidence Rule 403 is an extreme remedy to
be used sparingly and only in circumstances where the prejudicial danger substantially
outweighs the probative value of evidence. United States v. Reyes, 660 F.3d 454, 464 (9th Cir.
2011); see also United States v. Mende, 43 F.3d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 1995); and State v. Gauna,
117 Idaho 83, 88, 785 P.2d 647,652 (Ct. App. 1989).
Again, in the instant case it is clear the district court weighed the credibility of Dr.
Wischmeyer' s testimony and its foundation when it engaged in the IR.E. 403 balancing test. It
was improper for the district court to do so because in determining the probative value of
evidence, the district court must treat the evidence as fact. Evans, supra. As explained above, the
district court criticized Dr. Wischmeyer for failing to consider certain evidence the district court
deemed important, ignoring Dr. Wischmeyer' s explanations for considering or discounting
evidence. R. p. 2255-58, 3030-36. The district court was also critical of the evidence Dr.

When language in an Idaho civil rule is identical to the language of its federal counterpart,
Idaho courts should interpret the Idaho civil rule in conformance with its federal counterpart.
Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co. Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 897, 188 P.3d 834 (2008).
2
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Wischmeyer relied upon. R. p. 3032-34. In the district court's second opinion on the matter, the
district court held:
When ruling on the admissibility of evidence, the Court must also examine the
proposed evidence under I.R.E. 403. As stated by the Court in its February 2014
ruling: (a) in the instant matter there is no reliable evidence Dr. Allen was using
or abusing drugs in 2010 when he was treating Harvey Wainio; (b) the evidence
shows Dr. Allen was being strictly monitored for any use of drugs during that
same time period (though it is of concern that testing did not include propofol);
(c) even if evidence of Dr. Allen's drug abuse prior to 2010 was relevant, its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury. The Court remains of the
opinion that any probative value regarding Dr. Allen's pre-rehabilitation drug use
is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading of the jury.
R. p. 3034-35. There can be no doubt that the district court's disbelief of the foundation for Dr.
Wischmeyer's testimony was a critical factor in the district court's determination that the
probative value of the testimony was outweighed by unfair prejudice.
Once again, permitting a court to evaluate the credibility of evidence prior to ruling the
evidence inadmissible under I.R.E. 403 allows the court to invade the province of the jury. In the
criminal context, the I.R.E. 403 balancing test employed by the district court in this case would
permit courts to evaluate the credibility of witnesses such as informants and defendants who
have entered plea deals prior to determining whether the testimony of such witnesses is more
probative than prejudicial. This is highly problematic because the determination of the credibility
of such witnesses is clearly the province of the jury, not the court.
Allowing the district court to consider the credibility of evidence prior to engaging in the
I.R.E. 403 balancing test would turn the test on its head and make the critical element of the test
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the credibility of the evidence in the eyes of the court. Juries would be limited to hearing only
evidence the court believed because evidence the court doesn't find credible would never be
found to be more probative than prejudicial.
Appellants respectfully request the Court reject the I.R.E. 403 balancing test engaged in
by the district court, overturn the court's finding that Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony was more
prejudicial than probative, and remand this matter back to the district court for a determination of
the admissibility of the testimony without weighing the credibility or the testimony or its
foundation. Instead, the district court should be instructed that it is to treat Dr. Wischmeyer's
testimony and its foundation as true in determining whether the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect.
3.

The District Court's New Standard For The Admissibility Of Expert
Testimony Violated The Appellants' Constitutional Right To A Trial
By Jury By Summarily Weighing The Factual Evidence Reserved For
The Trier Of Fact.

The trial court's ruling striking Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony, when the court applied
improper standards and weighed evidence, interferes with Appellants' right to a trial by jury, as
guaranteed under the Idaho State Constitution. The Idaho Constitution guarantees the right to a
jury trial as it existed at common law at the time the Idaho Constitution was adopted. Kirkland v.
Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464,467, 4 P.3d 1115, 1119 (Idaho, 2000) citing State
v. Bennion, 112 Idaho 32, 37, 730 P.2d 952 (1986). As early as 1871, common law in Idaho
recognized it was the responsibility of the jury to award reasonable, noneconomic damages.
Kirkland, 134 Idaho at 467 citing Cox v. North-Western Stage Co., 1 Idaho 376 (Id. Terr.,
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1871)(Affirming a jury's award of non-economic damages to an injured passenger on a stage
coach because it was the province of the jury to determine damages and the jury had not abused
its discretion). A long line of cases in Idaho has upheld the notion that reasonably determined
damages by a jury should not be disturbed. Garrett v. Taylor, 69 Idaho 487, 489, 210 P.2d
386, (l949)(Citing Reinhold v. Spencer, 53 Idaho 688, 26 P.2d 796 (Idaho, 1933)). It is up to the
jury, as the trier of fact, to weigh the credibility of admissible expert testimony. Coombs v.
Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 137, 219 P.3d 453 (2009) citing City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho
580, 585, 130P.3d1118, 1123 (2006).
As explained above, the district court invaded the province of the jury by weighing the
credibility of Dr. Wischmeyer' s testimony, and the credibility of the foundation for his
testimony, prior to determining its admissibility. The district court also invaded the prince of the
jury when it determined whether his testimony was more prejudicial than probative. This action
by the district court denied Appellants their right to a trial by jury. This action also denied the
community's right to participate in the justice system by preventing a jury from considering
admissible evidence regarding the negligent actions of a member of the community. As a public
policy matter, the courts should not be determining the credibility of evidence prior to its
consideration by a jury because such action denies the ability of the community, through a jury,
to consider public safety issues including physician drug abuse and criminal activity. See, Miller
v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 351, 924 P.2d 607, (1996) (stating that practicing medicine in Idaho is
a privilege that is regulated, "to assure the public health of the citizenry").
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The foundation of the civil and criminal justice systems is that credibility issues
determined by the fact finder, not a court. To hold otherwise would be to prevent plaintiffs and
victims of crime from having their case determined by a jury of their peers and further denies the
community its role in the justice system by preventing juries from considering admissible
evidence on the grounds that the court disbelieves the evidence. Therefore, Appellants
respectfully request the district court's ruling on Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony be overturned, that
the matter be remanded back to the district court for further review, and that the district court be
instructed that it is to take Dr. Wischmeyer's opinions and the foundation for his opinions as true
in considering whether the opinions are admissible expert testimony and are more probative than
prejudicial.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial court's decision on
Respondent's motion for summary judgment. The issue of agency is one of fact. Moreover,
Respondent's independent negligence is also an issue of fact. There are material facts in dispute
upon which reasonable minds can reach differing conclusions. Thus, summary judgment is
inappropriate. The case should be remanded to the district court for further action consistent with
this Court's opinion.
Additionally, Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial court's
finding that Appellants' expert testimony is inadmissible. The district court applied an improper
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standard when determining the admissibility of the evidence and, when determining whether the
evidence was more probative than prejudicial.
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